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ABSTRACT 
GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY IN EURASIA- THE CASE OF TURKMENISTAN 
DILYARA AZIZOVA 
M.A. Thesis in Political Science, June 2017 
Thesis supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu 
Keywords: Geopolitics, Natural gas, Turkmenistan, Energy routes, Diversification. 
Turkmenistan with the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world is set to play 
a crucial role in world’s energy politics. Yet, its prospects to do so is hindered due its 
unfavorable geopolitics and the landlocked position of the country.  This thesis provides a 
broad analysis of the shifting dimensions of Turkmenistan’s energy sector by reviewing its 
bilateral relations with neighboring countries with an emphasis on past and ongoing 
projects. Additionally, this work will focus on the likelihood of potential diversification of 
existing natural gas routes by taking up geopolitical considerations such as security, access 
to international waters and relations with the surrounding neighborhood. The main 
research questions that this thesis seeks to answer are the following: what are the feasible 
scenarios for Turkmenistan to diversify their natural gas export market? What are the 
major geopolitical factors that restrict Turkmenistan’s ability to diversify their gas routes? 
In considering these questions, the emphasis will be on determining the feasibility of 
different natural gas routes between Turkmenistan and its partners, and the future 
prospects of Turkmen gas trade relations with emerging markets. 
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ÖZET 
AVRASYANIN ENERJİ JEOPOLİTİĞİ – TÜRKMENİSTAN ÖRNEĞİ 
DİLYARA AZİZOVA 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2017 
Tez danışmanı: Doç.Dr Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu 
Anahtar kelimeler: Jeopolitik, Doğal gaz, Türkmenistan, Enerji kaynakları, Çeşitlendirme. 
Türkmenistan dünyadaki en büyük dördüncü doğal gaz rezervine sahip ülke olarak 
dünya enerji siyasetinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Ancak, bu role dair beklentiler 
ülkenin elverişsiz jeopolitiği ve kara ile çevrili pozisyonu dolayısıyla engellenmekte. Bu 
tez Türkmenistan'ın enerji sektörünün değişen dinamiklerini komşu ülkelerle hali hazırda 
sürdürülen ve geçmişte yapılmış projeleri inceleyerek geniş bir analizini sunmaktadır. 
Ayrıca, bu çalışma mevcut enerji yollarının potansiyel farklılaşması ihtimalini jeopolitiği 
güvenlik, uluslararası sulara ulaşım ve çevredeki komşu ülkelerle ilişkiler üzerinden 
inceleyecektir. Bu tezin cevaplamaya çalıştığı temel araştırma konularından bazıları: 
Türkmenistan'ın doğalgaz ihracat marketini çeşitlendirmek için uygulanabilir senaryoları 
nelerdir? Türkmenistan'ın gaz rotasını çeşitlendirmesini sınırlayan başlıca jeopolitik 
faktörler nelerdir? Bu soruları göz önünde bulundurduğumuzda, Türkmenistan ve 
ortaklarının arasındaki farklı doğalgaz rotalarının uygulanabilirliğine karar verilmesi ve 
yeni gelişen pazarla birlikte Türkmen gaz ticaretinin gelecekteki görünümü üzerinde 
durulacaktır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turkmenistan has enormous natural gas reserves, estimated at 17.5 trillion cubic 
meters, ranked as the fourth largest following those of Qatar, Iran and Russia.1 Following 
the independence in 1991, Turkmenistan had to learn how to manage its own natural gas 
reserves. One of the initial steps that the first President of Turkmenistan, Saparmyrat 
Niyazov, took was to maintain gas trade relations with countries to which there were 
exiting pipeline connections.  Since these early years, natural gas is exported to external 
actors solely based on bilateral agreements and which are usually signed for the long term, 
the shortest being around five years.  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the biggest buyer of Turkmen gas has been 
Russia (mainly because of existing pipeline connections). This has resulted in Russia’s 
monopolization of Turkmen gas. Consequently, in order to break free from Russian 
influence, Niyazov created a plan for diversification of Turkmenistan’s energy routes. 
While the state was able to diversify to the direction of neighboring Iran in the 1990’s and 
China starting in 2009, one of the major problems that Ashgabat still faces is its 
unfavorable geopolitical position and the landlocked nature of the country.  
This thesis identifies the formidable challenges facing Turkmenistan’s in its efforts 
to export its natural gas and then examines possible future scenarios for diversifying its 
export destinations. Analyses made in the thesis point to Turkmenistan’s unfortunate 
geopolitical situation as a landlocked country the chief cause of its to diversify its natural 
gas markets. In this thesis the notion of geopolitics will be looked through Turkmenistan’s 
energy relations with neighboring countries. Under the term of the ‘geopolitics of energy’ I 
identify the current and future scenarios of possible gas pipeline connections from 
Turkmenistan’s gas fields connecting abroad. As for the theoretical standpoint, I go onto 
elaborate three major dynamics at play with respect to geopolitics: post-Soviet legacy, 
neighboring hegemony, and cross national borders. By post-Soviet legacy, I consider the 
                                                          
1 Mammadov.Q (2015), “Turkmenistan positions itself as Eurasian natural gas power”, Oil and Gas Journal. Baku.Az 
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role of Soviet drawn national borders as well as inherited already existing pipeline 
networks. This dynamic is crucial in explaining the case of Turkmenistan as compared to 
other resource rich and landlocked countries. By neighboring hegemony, I first examine 
Russia’s influence in the Central Asian gas market during the 1990s and then go on to 
consider the shifting of regional hegemonic power from Russia to China beginning in 
2010. By cross national borders, I explain the decisive role that borders play with regard to 
the trade and transportation of natural gas between countries.  
This thesis is divided in to six chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of 
Turkmenistan geopolitics and the natural gas trade following country’s independence from 
the Soviet Union. This chapter reviews the total natural gas reserve capacity in the country 
by examining the exiting gas fields that are being used and the companies that are in 
charge of operating them.  Moreover, this chapter lists the number of developed and 
undeveloped gas fields illustrating the full potential of the country’s reserves that are ready 
to be exported. 
The second chapter focuses on China’s rising natural gas demand in tandem with its 
consumption. Growing concern of increasing environmental effects of coal, China might 
also shift to natural gas taking advantage of low prices of LNG in global markets. In 
addition this chapter provides a justification based on the future gas demand scenario for 
further bilateral energy cooperation between Turkmenistan and China. 
The third chapter focuses on past bilateral relations between Russia and 
Turkmenistan starting from mid 1990s. In this chapter I briefly analyze the transition of 
Turkmen- Russian Gas relations and its transformation after the disintegration and the 
tensions that the two countries faced due to the gas disputes in early 2000’s. This chapter is 
essential to investigate Turkmen – Russian rivalry over the European Gas market and 
Russia’s geopolitical advantage over Turkmenistan. The last part of the chapter provides a 
detailed breakdown of the reasons behind the termination of the Gazprom’s contracts with 
Turkmenistan leading to end of Russo – Turkmen gas cooperation on January 2016. 
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The fourth chapter takes up on Turkmenistan’s energy relations with Iran and their 
share in overall gas exports from Turkmenistan. The main challenges on writing this 
chapter is the limited statistical evidence available and lack of transparency in terms of the 
signed agreements between the two countries. Additionally, this chapter deliberates on the 
barter exchange of goods in return to Turkmen gas in Iran which is one of the leading 
causes for current dispute on debt settling between the two parties. This chapter will sum 
up by analyzing the scenarios of future bilateral cooperation and reasons why there is an 
anticipation of the successful resolution of the debt dispute between the two countries. 
The purpose of the chapter number five is to analyze the feasibility of the Trans-
Caspian pipeline. The chapter indicates the barriers limiting the usage of Caspian as the 
energy transit zone. The first barrier is the unresolved legal status of the Caspian, the issue 
that created an open conflict between the coastal states. Hence, this chapter will view the 
negotiation rounds in attempts to resolve this issue, furthermore illustrating Russian 
predominant role in settlement of the dispute. 
The last chapter considers Turkmenistan’s possible diversification towards its 
partners in the East mainly through three main projects: TAPI, Central Asia- China 
pipeline and Iran as a potential LNG hub. This chapter identifies possible challenges that 
could undermine the feasibility of each project by mentioning why some of the projects 
(particularly TAPI) have not been successful up until now. 
The main sources that I use in this work include the annual reports of International 
Energy Agency, notably, World Energy Outlook and statistics collected by British 
Petroleum Company. On the basis of available information, this thesis analyses current and 
previous bilateral relations between Turkmenistan and its partners, identifying the major 
factors that pose challenges to Turkmenistan’s ability to export gas and thus, to take 
advantage of its substantial energy resources.  
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     CHAPTER 1 
The Geopolitical significance of Turkmen Gas 
The geopolitical fate of Turkmenistan has been determined by two major factors; its 
geographical location and its abundance of natural gas supplies.2 Following the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union, the ex com-party leader Saparmyrat Niyazov became the first 
president of the independent Turkmenistan. After gaining their independence on 27 
October 1992 one of the first steps that President Niyazov took was to obtain a status of 
‘neutrality’ – some critics argue that initial idea of asking for this status was to break free 
from Russian influence3. I on the other hand think Russia is not the only reason behind 
Turkmenistan’s willingness in getting their neutrality. Lack of strong military apparatus 
and inability of Ashgabat to secure the state from the external threats was also another 
reason for seeking such status.4 Moreover, the status of ‘permanent neutrality’ provided 
Turkmen’s sovereignty to conduct a bilateral foreign policy with different countries with 
relative independence from Russia. Furthermore it also allowed Turkmen leadership to 
pursue the track of isolationism which has started during Niyazov’s term and still 
continues with current Berdimuhammedov’s policies. 
Turkmenistan remains a highly authoritarian state with a presidential single-party 
system. Abundance of hydrocarbon resources is what enables the consolidation of the 
existing authoritarianism.5 In this chapter I will first examine the domestic production and 
consumption patterns of Turkmen gas; second look at the existing gas field reserves and 
the future natural gas production scenarios which have been covered in the report of                
2016 World Energy Outlook. 
                                                          
2 Akiner,Shirin. The Caspian: politics, energy and security.  Chapter 11: Turkmenistan's Caspian resources and its 
International political economy, author:  Germana Canzi London: Routledge Curzon, 2004. Print. 
3 Cummings, Sally N., ed. Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia. London: Routledge Cruzon, 2003. 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
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1.1 Turkmenistan Natural Gas production and consumption 
 
T
Table 1.1 Turkmenistan’s gas production per year 
 
According to the BP Report for 2015, the total change in the production between 
2013 and 2014 was about 11 percent in total. The domestic gas consumption on the other 
hand remains relatively low. This low domestic consumption could be explained by 
Turkmenistan’s small population which is estimated to be about 4.5 million. Table 1.1 
illustrates the data on the domestic consumption of the country from 2009 to 2014. 
  
 
Table 1.2 Turkmenistan’s annual gas consumption 
As the table 1.2 demonstrates, the domestic consumption of Turkmenistan hasn’t 
been more than 30 bcm per year.  Yet given its population (4.5 million), per capita 
domestic consumption is high. This is the case since there are no other sources of energy 
available. The low domestic gas consumption could be mainly explained by the lack of 
advanced industry in the country.6 Gas derived energy products are sold to the citizens at a 
much discounted price. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the domestic gas 
consumption was completely free in the country and following the President’s Niyazov 
death and the ensuing in leadership in 2006 domestic prices have increased only slightly.  
                                                          
6 Bohr, Annette “Independent Turkmenistan: from post-communism to Sultanism.” Cummings, Sally N., ed. Oil, 
Transition and Security in Central Asia. London: Routledge Cruzon, 2003. 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
bcm 36.4 42.4 59.5 62.3 62.3 69.3 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
bcm 19.7 22.6 23.5 26.3 22.9 27.7 
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The projected scenario for Turkmenistan’s natural gas production in comparison to 
the Non-OECD countries clearly illustrates the expected result of rich resources recently 
discovered. 
Years 2000 2014 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2014-2024 Change
Non OECD 1396 2267 2393 2672 2981 3300 3600 1.8%
E.E/Eurasia 729 858 879 949 1020 1095 1142 1.1%
Azerbaijan 6 19 25 35 43 51 55 4.1%
Russia 573 630 636 668 698 730 758 0.7%
Turkmenistan 47 80 97 119 142 166 181 3.2%
Table 1.3: World’s Gas Production Scenario 20167 
The table 1.3 demonstrates the projected production scenarios shows an increase 
starting from 2000’s up until 2040 it is estimated that it is going to increase even further. 
The reason for the increase in production is mainly due to the discovery of the new gas 
fields. These projections point to Turkmenistan’s need to monetize its natural gas 
resources by finding access to new markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 For details look at the World Energy Outlook gas production 2016. 
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1.2 Turkmenistan’s Gas Fields 
Field name Proven reserves (bcm) Operator Current Market Potential Market
Dauletabad 1200 TurkmenGaz Before domestic Russia, Iran India, Pakistan
Darganata                              n/a TurkmenGaz Before domestic Russia, Iran
Mayskoye 11 TurkmenGaz Russia
Gagarinskoe 23 TurkmenGaz Russia
Korpezhe 141 TurkmenGaz Russia
Malay                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia
Shatlyk 1000 TurkmenGaz Russia Europe
Naip TurkmenGaz Russia
Kerpichli                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia
Kukurtli                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia
Seirap                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia
Uchhadzhy                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia
Shokrat                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia Europe
Okarem                              n/a TurkmenGaz Russia
Byazshkyzyl 100 TurkmenGaz Russia, China
Saman Depe 1300 CNPC China
Galkynysh 13100 CNPC, Hundai/en China India, Pakistan
South Gutlayak                              n/a 
Agarguyu                              n/a 
North Gazlydere                              n/a 
Dervezekom                              n/a 
Shabasan                              n/a 
Karadzhulak                              n/a 
Total 17500
 Table 1.4: List of Turkmenistan’s Gas Fields8 
There are a total of 22 gas fields that are fully developed in Turkmenistan, while 
remaining potential 6 gas fields are not developed yet.9 According to British Petroleum 
estimates of the 18 existing developed gas fields, there are records for only 8 of them:  
Dauletabad field: is located on the Northern Iran border and the proven reserves are 
estimated to be about 1,200 bcm. 
Mayskoe (Minara) field: is located in the Southeastern part of Turkmenistan’s Mary region 
estimated gas reserves are 11 bcm. 
                                                          
8 Table recreated from Oil and Gas Journal, 2016 
9 See table 1.4  
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Gagarinskoe gas field:  also located in Southeast of Turkmenistan and the estimated gas 
reserves are 23 bcm. 
Byashkyzyl gas field: total capacity of the field is 100 bcm one of the Caspian fields 
located in Turkmenbashy area. 
Shatlyk gas field: located within the area of the Amu-Derya basin, the fourth biggest gas 
field in Turkmenistan, the proven reserves estimated to be about 1000 bcm. 
Korpedzhe gas field: located in the Southwest of Turkmenistan, one of the major onshore 
assets in the South Caspian basin, the estimated reserves are 141 bcm. 
Saman-Depe gas field:  located in Lebap province, it belongs to the Bagtyyarlyk area. It is 
the second largest gas field in the country, estimated gas reserves in this field are 1300 
bcm. 
Galkynysh gas field: located in the South Yoloten, Mary region and it is the largest gas 
field in Turkmenistan and Central Asia, the estimated gas reserves is 13,100 bcm. 
Even though Russia’s major gas fields are higher in terms of its proven gas reserves 
(for example: Bovanenskoe field is about 67,400 bcm) still Turkmenistan’s proven gas 
reserves (with the total capacity of 17500) are enough to fulfill the demands of the major 
Asian energy importers.10 However, the geopolitical location and the landlocked nature of 
the country limit its sale potential. In the next part I will review the major international gas 
companies that have signed bilateral export agreements with Turkmenistan. 
 
                                                          
10 Gazprom official web side:” Russian Bovanenskoe Gas field” Retrieved from: 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/mega-yamal/ Retrieved on: 24/05/2017 
9 
 
1.3 Bilateral Agreements with International Gas Companies. 
There are total of three international gas companies that have invested/operated in 
Turkmenistan. One of the first companies that have contributed with their investments was 
Russian Gazprom in the beginning of 2000’s. Gazprom has breached their contract with 
Turkmenistan in January 2016. The company that is currently operating and has a long-
term bilateral contract is CNPC that has sponsored the Central Asia- China pipeline. 
CNPC: China’s National Petroleum Company:  the major pipeline was constructed 
in 2013, China is mainly importing from the largest field, which is Galkynysh. The staring 
exports in 2013 were about 25 bcm per year.  According to Russia state news agency 
TASS, China is purchasing Turkmen gas at a giveaway rate of 185 USD per thousand 
cubic meters while to normal price rates are currently about 200-220 USD per thousand 
cubic meters of gas.11 CNPC also exports from Saman-Depe, Altyn asyr pipeline the total 
amount taken from this gas field is unknown. 
Iran National Gas Company: operates in the Korpedzhe gas field, starting from the 
early 2000’s, estimated supply 7.5 bcm per year12. 
  Russia’s Gazprom: Out of 22 fields half of them used to be utilized by Russian 
Gazprom Company, the operations halted in the beginning of January in 2016, when 
following the termination of its contract with Turkmenistan. 
1.4 Conclusion 
 To conclude this chapter, as one can observe even though the total gas reserves are 
very high, in 2016 Turkmenistan has lost Russia as one of their major gas market. The 
result of the termination had mainly to do with the fall of the demand in the European 
market. Additionally, some critics argue that Russia was ready to leave Turkmenistan after 
                                                          
11  "China Figures Reveal Cheapness of Turkmenistan Gas." Eurasia Net, October 31, 2016. http://www.eurasianet.org/ 
12 Parkhomchik Lidiya, Hayal Ayca Simsek and Zhuldyz Kanapiyanova. "Turkmenistan-Iran Energy Cooperation." 
Eurasian Research Institute, July 07, 2015. Accessed July 13, 2015. http://eurasian-research.org/ 
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the economic crisis of 200913. After the departure of Gazprom the fields that used to be 
operated by the company are now empty. On the other hand, Iran’s exports have also been 
halted by Ashgabat due to the debt of almost two billion dollars that still haven’t been paid 
by the Tehran.  
Consequently, currently there are only two gas fields operated by China (Galkynysh 
and Saman-depe) which bring profit to the country, meaning that the stability of the 
Turkmen economy is solely dependent on the gas demand scenario of China. 
Consequently, the next chapter will discuss China’s future gas demands and the future 
geopolitical prospects of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
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CHAPTER 2 
China’s Gas Demands and Geopolitical change 
China’s adoption of the ‘open-door policy’ in 1978 resulted in staggering economic 
growth for over four decades. This rapid economic development in the country has further 
resulted in the growth of its energy demand thus requiring the expansion of the existing 
energy market. After 1978, China underwent remarkable expansion by introducing 
different policies to encourage foreign investment including structural reforms, market 
incentives, and decentralization policies.14 In 1997, the four-step restructuring plan in the 
electric power industry of China was introduced, which according to their plan is to be 
fulfilled by 2020. In 1998 China began its restructuring of coal and gas fields. The policies 
that were introduced to restructure the Chinese energy sector have resulted in the boom of 
the energy sector in China. The economic development has also brought an increase in 
China’s electricity sector.  As a result, China has had to react fast to fulfill the energy 
demand gap and start negotiations with different countries on gas imports and investments 
in transnational pipelines.  The investment decisions of China resulted in a geopolitical 
transformation of the world’s gas market. Chinese national gas companies were willing to 
invest in the Eurasian countries and import their gas easily, without the direct interference 
of Russia. I argue that this is mainly possible due to the geographic location of the China.  
In this chapter I will discuss the importance of geopolitical location which 
determines the pool of countries from which China will be able to import conventional gas 
and other sources of energy to fulfill the increasing energy demand in China. The main 
focus will be on the import scenario of conventional and LNG gas to China.  
Natural gas is the third most important natural resource after coal and oil. According 
to the International Energy Agency, natural gas is one of the fastest growing primary 
                                                          
14 World Energy Outlook (2014), “Gas Consumption Scenario”, pg: 140 Published by: International Energy Agency, 
Paris 2014. 
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energy sources in the world.15 However, the transportation of this type of commodity is 
fairly difficult; there are two ways by which the natural gas can be transported; through 
pipeline or by the process of liquefaction. Both of the transportation techniques are hard 
and very expensive. The construction of pipeline takes time and demands a high 
investment in its construction; the liquefaction of the gas has been more expensive 
however, in the past two years the process of liquefaction is becoming cheaper. For 
decades China has been using coal to fulfill their energy demands, however in the recent 
years the Chinese government has implemented new policies that will enable China to 
consume less coal substituting it with alternative energy sources, for the most part, with 
natural gas.  
China is the world’s most populous country, and according to the EIA reports in 
2013 it has surpassed the US as the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other 
liquids, though it was mainly caused by China’s raising oil consumption. The ‘Open door 
policy’ has enabled the industrial and technological advancement of the country, resulting 
in a growth of energy demand to maintain their factories and trading sector.  As we know, 
the energy demand growth is directly linked to the increase in energy consumption. The 
second chapter of my thesis is going to analyze the newly emerging demand for the natural 
gas in China and a general picture of its effects on the potential exporter.  Since 
Turkmenistan is one of the main conventional gas suppliers to China I believe there is a 
need to analyze China’s future natural gas scenario closely. Consequently, the first part of 
the chapter is going to provide figures that will summarize China’s energy consumption 
growth. 
2.1 Energy Consumption 
For the most part China was able to fulfill their energy demand for years by using 
coal. About 66 percent of the state’s total energy supply was primarily covered by coal.16 
                                                          
15 IEA “Natural Gas” Retrieved from: https://www.iea.org/topics/naturalgas/ 
16 "China: CNPC Increases Its Share Of Investments In Turkmenistan". 2016. Abo.Net. 
http://www.abo.net/oilportal/topic/view.do?contentId=2244400. 
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Second largest energy source in 2012 was oil (petroleum and other liquids). The attempt to 
diversify energy resources of China in 2012 was still not able to cover the amount of coal 
that is still being used in China. The figure 2.1 illustrates the redistribution of the Energy 
according to different sectors:  
 
Figure 2.1: China’s primary energy consumption graph 
From the figure 2.1 we can see that oil takes up only about 20 percent of the total 
energy consumption in China. Hydroelectric power is only about 8 percent while natural 
gas remains of very minimal part to the total (5 percent) on the energy circle.17 The major 
problem which is illustrated in this cycle is the amount of coal that is being used which 
results in severe air pollution throughout the country. China remains one of the most 
polluted countries in the world.18 The main reason for why coal is being used to the larger 
extent is the fact that there is an abundance of coal found within the country itself and also 
coal remains one of the cheapest raw material for the energy production which is used for 
                                                          
17 World Energy Outlook (2014), “Gas Consumption Scenario”, pg: 140 Published by: International Energy Agency, 
Paris 2014. 
 
18 World Energy Outlook 2014. Overview Gas Demand. Paris: International Energy Agency 
Total primary energy consumption in China by fuel type, 2012
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both electricity and heat generation. However, the air pollution which is caused by the 
burning of coal in China is becoming an increasingly significant point to consider. As a 
result of the high CO2 emissions, the Chinese government has adopted a new policy in an 
attempt to minimize the coal dependence from around 66 percent of total energy supply to 
62 percent by 2020.19 To achieve this goal, China first began investing in gas pipelines of 
natural gas rich countries such as Turkmenistan.  
The following chart illustrates the success of China’s reduction policy:  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                  
 
 
 
                                                          
19Dale. S (2015), “Energy in 2014: After a calm comes the storm”, Published by: British Petroleum, London, June 2016. 
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This figure 2.2 illustrates that the policy change in regards with the lowering the 
coal consumption has resulted in a positive effect. In a comparison with 2012, Chinese 
National Energy Agency has claimed that the coal consumption has dropped to almost 
64.2 percent by 2014.20 This progress is most likely due to a decline in a long-term 
scenario as the total energy consumption rises. However, Chinese high energy efficiency 
and its goal in increasing environmental sustainability are expected to result in the 
decrease of coal’s share in overall energy consumption.21 The implementation of these 
goals requires a transition from coal and oil to cleaner burning fuel which is natural gas.  
The next part of the second chapter will focus on China’s gas consumption according the 
newest World Energy Outlook.   
2.2 China’s Gas Production vs Consumption 
                                                          
20 China: CNPC Increases Its Share Of Investments In Turkmenistan". 2016. Abo.Net. 
http://www.abo.net/oilportal/topic/view.do?contentId=2244400. 
21 World Energy Outlook 2014. Overview Gas Demand. Paris: International Energy Agency. 
  
1990 2012 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 
2012-2040 
  
 
Delta CAAGR* 
OECD 1036  1626  1724  1809  1886  1952  2004  378 0.70% 
Americas  628 901  994  1048  1109  1146  1184  283 1.00% 
United States 533  727 791   827 869  881  895  168  0.70% 
Europe 325  507  531 558 572 595 610 103  0.70% 
Asia-Oceania 83 218 199 203 207 211 210 -7 -0.10% 
Japan 57 127 99 99 101 103 102  -25  -0.80% 
Non-OECD 1004 1806 2142 2431 2724  3035 3343  1537  2.20% 
E.Europe/Eurasia 738 692 693 714 740 775 807 115 0.50% 
Caspian 100 117 134 146 155 166 177 60 1.50% 
Russia 447 471 455 459 471 488 504 33 0.20% 
Asia 85 433 645 793 934 1086 1240 807 3.80% 
China 16 148 295 387 471 545 603 455 5.20% 
India 13 57 82 109 136 167 202 145 4.60% 
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Table 2.1: Data on China’s natural gas 
The New Policies Scenario published by WEO projects that gas demand in China is 
expected to have the largest growth between 2012 and 2040.22 From 148 bcm in 2012 
China’s demand is expected to increase to around 603 bcm by 2040 which is illustrated in 
Table 2.1 Natural gas demand by region 
The diversification of the energy mix (especially in urban areas) from the large use 
of coal to the natural gas consumption is the way to improve air quality and reduce the air 
pollution. To make this expansion possible the government will be required to continue 
their gas reforms started in the last couple of years and as well as their investments in this 
sector. To understand how dependent China is on the external gas resources, it is necessary 
to look not only to the conventional gas exports through pipelines but to LNG supplies and 
suppliers as well. 
The demand for gas in China has doubled from 2011 to 2015, hence, all sources of 
gas supply including domestic production, unconventional sources, LNG and pipeline gas 
has become necessary to satisfy this demand. It is not enough just to import sufficient 
amount of gas to satisfy the supply, but gas also needs to be distributed to the final users in 
the regions where there is a deficiency as well as ensuring security of the supply in those 
regions.23 The process of such redistribution requires a significant amount of investments; 
hence, China will have to continue on expanding their existing investments in the energy 
markets. There are several challenges that the government is facing while implementing 
                                                          
22 World Energy Outlook 2014. Overview Gas Demand. Paris: International Energy Agency. 
23 Dale. S (2015), “Energy in 2014: After a calm comes the storm”, Published by: British Petroleum, London, June 2016. 
Middle East 86 404 469 531 598 650 696 292 2.00%  
Africa 35 120 156 185 215 250 294 174 3.20% 
Latin America 60 156 178 208 237 273 306 150 2.40% 
Brazil 4 32 38 54 66 81 96 64 4.00% 
World 2040 3432 3872 4249 4626 5007 5378 1946 1.60% 
European Union 371 478 491 515 528 546 559 81 0.60% 
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their new gas market policies. The first problem is the gas pricing and the regulatory 
reform of Chinese market. The transition of China’s gas from 148 bcm to 295 bcm is not 
only challenging in terms of attracting the possible countries where to invest but also 
challenging in terms of the creation of a sufficient import infrastructure. During the project 
the infrastructure has to be built in such a way so it could directly connect to domestic 
transmitting system. Moreover, for the LNG gas there is a need to have a more expansive 
storage infrastructure (especially for the LNG gas). Nevertheless, these issues haven’t 
become major obstacles for China to build significant import infrastructures in Myanmar, 
Central Asia and in addition other LNG markets. The infrastructure however, is mainly 
dominated by the three big National Oil Companies such as CNPC, SNP and Sinopec. 
Although natural gas production in China is increasing, the total fuel is still limited 
to 5 percent of China’s total energy cycle. China itself holds about 164 trillion cubic 
meters of proved natural gas reserves.24 There are several policies and agreements that 
have been signed to expand not only the gas import of China but to also expand China’s 
own natural gas production.  China has tripled in their natural gas production between 
2003 and 2013. The main target that the state wants to reach is 6.5 trillion cubic feet (184 
bcm) by 202025, in order to use more of the natural gas as the primary energy sources in a 
replacement of burning coal and oil. The next graph will illustrate China’s gas production 
in numbers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24  EIA “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Gas Resources: China”, Published by : EIA, Washington DC, 2015. 
25 Ibid 
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Figure 2.4: China’s growing natural gas consumption26 
From this chart we can see that the breaking point in the gas production took place 
in 2007 ( when the imports exceeded the exports) with the rapid growth in the gas demand 
and it haven’t changed since then, on the contrary the demand level continues to exceed 
the production level of natural gas in China. The state is anticipating improving the share 
of natural gas almost to 10 percent by 2020 which will help them to lessen their coal 
production and reduce CO2 emission caused by the burning of coal.27 Switching from coal 
to gas is also important due to the heating system of China during the winter, traditionally 
Chinese people are burning coal to warm their houses during winter, and as the result there 
is more air pollution during the winter time especially in the urban areas, where no other 
alternative heating system is established. Even though the majority of gas consumption 
stems from the industrial user which is about 32 percent of the total gas usage, the other 
share is used in the power and transportation sectors which have increased in the last 
decade.28  China’s energy consumption by source is shown in figure 2.5: 
                                                          
26 BP “ Report on China’s growing natural gas demand” 2015 Outlook 
27 EIA “Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Gas Resources: China”, Published by : EIA, Washington DC, 2015. 
28 "China - International - Analysis - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)". 2016.Eia.Gov. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
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Figure 2.5: China Energy Consumption by Fuel type29 
From the graph given above we can see the pre-dominance of coal as the major 
energy source, and the lowest source is renewable.  Gas usage as the primary energy 
source between 1982 and 2010 is also minimal in comparison with other countries.30 One 
of the reasons why gas rate is so low is because of a lack of existing pipeline infrastructure 
In China. Consequently, since there are no exiting pipelines, there are only two ways to 
import foreign gas firstly, by infesting and building the pipelines and secondly, by 
importing LNG gas. After reviewing the general situation of China’s  has market and its 
consumption, the next part of the chapter will be devoted to a discussion of China’s 
investments , exiting projects and future investments and potential challenges of the gas 
market. 
2.3 China’s Natural Gas Fields 
There are several on regions in China that produce a shale gas. There are total of 7 
shale gas basins in different parts of China. In the Southwest – Sichuan basin, Northwest- 
                                                          
29 Energy Collective graphs  from online journal. 
30 World Energy Outlook 2014; Overview Gas Demand. Paris: International Energy Agency. 
Total primary energy consumption in China by fuel type, 2012
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Tarim, Junggar and Qaidam Basins, up North-Ordos basin and the last one which is an 
offshore basin is Pearl River Mouth basin.  I will divide the basins into three categories: 
  
Map 2.1: China’s Natural Gas (Shale Gas Fields) 
a) Sichuan Basin:  This is China’s key natural gas producing area located in the Southwestern 
region in China. Sinopec has discovered up to 350 billion cubic feet in 2012. 
b) Northwest Basins: This basin is located in Xinjiang Autonomous region of China, 
historically it was China’s most productive gas producing regions, currently, and in 2014 it 
was supplying 832 billion cubic feet which is 19 percent of China’s total gas production. 
c) Northeast Basins: Changqing oil basin is China’s largest gas producing area. About 31 
percent of all gas supplies in China are coming from that basin. 
 
In total it is estimated that due to the adoption of new polices by China the gas 
consumption in the region will increase resulting in the increase in demand, which China 
won’t be able to satisfy through their domestic gas production, hence, the gas imports will 
increase. According to this graph it is estimated that by 2035 gas consumption will 
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increase up to twelve trillion cubic feet of natural gas, while the production will be 
satisfying only half of the consumption which is about 6 trillion cubic feet. The following 
graph will illustrate the general picture on China’s demand vs supply scenario. 
 
Figure 2.6: Consumption and Production Scenario in China 
According to the BP statistics the estimated consumption of gas in China in the year 
of 2013 was about 160 bcm in total and the production level was about 100 bcm, the 
supply gap was satisfied by the imports coming from the external markets. 
2.4 China’s Gas market interests and investments 
When a country decides to expand their gas market, there are several factors that 
this country will consider. Firstly, they will look at existing pipeline routes, through which 
the country can import the gas. This was the case in the post- Soviet countries when the 
gas exporting countries continued to export their gas because of the pipelines that were 
inherited from the Soviet Union. Secondly, the potential importer would look at the world 
map and select closest country with abundance of gas resource and will try to establish the 
energy trading relations with them.  The second scenario is exactly what China did 
22 
 
(considering the gas prices) while planning their investments. However, the second feature 
does not apply to the LNG gas contracts that China has signed with African countries.  In 
this part of the paper I will review the list of the gas rich countries and will see the 
investment patterns of Chinese national oil companies in the pipelines and gas fields in 
different countries. 
According to BP estimates and IEA agency China has become second largest natural 
gas importer. In 2014, however BP has project that due to the sharp slow in the economic 
growth in China the energy consumption is also expected to slow to about 2.6 percent in 
2014 (which is still very high number considering the GDP of the country), though it is 
less than half of the average that China had in the last ten years.31  In terms of China’s gas 
importing countries, Turkmenistan has received the major portion of investments from 
China. In 2014 according to the official figures provided by CNPC, they have signed a 4 
billion dollar agreement with Turkmenistan for the development of Bagtyyarlyk area. The 
capacity of the Galkynysh field in Turkmenistan is about 9 billion cubic meters per year, 
and the second field is about 6 billion cubic meters, which makes a total capacity of 10 
billion cubic meters per year making Turkmenistan a country with 4th largest gas reservoirs 
on earth.32 The total import from Turkmenistan to China is about 46 percent of the total 
China’s gas imports. The second largest country for the China’s imports is Qatar, 
satisfying about total of 16 percent of country’s gas imports and the third largest country is 
Australia taking up about 12 percent of the total gas imports coming to China. The 
following figure will illustrate the other countries in the circle of exporters: 
 
 
                                                          
31 "China: CNPC Increases Its Share Of Investments In Turkmenistan". 2016. Abo.Net. 
http://www.abo.net/oilportal/topic/view.do?contentId=2244400. 
32 "China - International - Analysis - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)". 2016.Eia.Gov. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
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Figure 2.7: China’s Gas Exports graph33  
The figure 2.6 is a good illustration of the importance of geopolitics when we talk 
about energy market. Geopolitics is the defining term to describe where the combination of 
resources is located geographically.  Political aspect of the negotiations should also be 
taken into consideration hence, energy most of the times used as the political tool in 
changing and reversing political game in favor to the exporting country.  Despite this fact, 
abundance of natural resources doesn’t always bring benefits to the exporting countries, 
especially if the state that sells the product is initially bound by a rentier type of economy 
and is dependent on the income coming from the sales of the energy product.  
Turkmenistan remains a vital energy partner for China due to its large gas reserves 
and the geographical location, which makes the process of pipeline construction easier. 
China has expanded their gas purchases not only to Turkmenistan but including 
Uzbekistan and also sees Kazakhstan as the potential energy partner as well naming their 
project “A new Silk road”. This project initiated by China was welcomed in Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan but alerted Kazakhstani government. The major threat that Almaty is 
afraid of facing is the potential expansion of China which will result in spill over on the 
borders between China and Kazakhstan34.  The position of Turkmen government and their 
warm feelings to China is not surprising. After the Gazprom terminated their contract with 
                                                          
33 BP 2015 report on Gas Exports to China 
34 Wu, Kang. 2013. Energy Economy in China. New Jersey: World Scientific. 
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Turkmenistan on gas purchases in the beginning of this year, the rentier state had to feel in 
their economic gap by finding an alternative market to sell their gas. Though there is a risk 
of Turkmenistan to become completely dependent on the China’s gas purchases which will 
be disastrous for the Turkmen economy in case of sharp decline of China’s gas demand. 
The sudden drop in the oil prices at the end of March 2016, has directly influenced the gas 
market as well.  Despite the fact that the natural gas sales are initiated through direct 
bilateral agreements decrease in oil prices could potentially lead to the decrease in gas 
prices as well. 
2.5 Future Gas Market Scenario in China 
As in any other developing economy, there is time when economy hits recession 
likewise China has faced a sharp economic decline in 2014. This slowing has been for the 
most part complemented by the continuing shift of the pattern of growth35, from the sectors 
such as steel production, iron and cement China has shifted to the more service- oriented 
parts of its economy.36 While this change should result in the decline of the China’s energy 
imports, gas sector demand will remain the same due to the China’s plan to reduce the air 
pollution and decrease in coal production. In terms of LNG imports, all of the gas coming 
from Qatar will be in form of LNG gas, due to logistic difficulties in importing gas via 
pipelines. Most of the gas that will be entering China through pipeline will be coming from 
Turkmenistan. The LNG market scenario is indicated illustrated from the figure 2.7: 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 China - International - Analysis - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2016. Eia.Gov. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
36 China: CNPC Increases Its Share Of Investments In Turkmenistan. 2016. Abo.Net. 
http://www.abo.net/oilportal/topic/view.do?contentId=2244400. 
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Figure 2.8: China LNG import sources, 201437 
Qatar having the largest gas reserves in the world will be the major LNG supplier 
to China. Australia and Malaysia is the other two countries exporting LNG to China. In 
2016, for the first time exports from the Caspian region to China overtook those to Russia, 
mainly, due to the cancellation of the Gazprom gas contracts with Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
2.6 Conclusion 
To conclude my chapter on short analysis of China’s gas market we should 
summarize several points.  Firstly, China’s further gas investment will depend on the 
energy demand rate and the economic development of the country. As if for now, the 
future scenario is illustrated in the table 2.2: 
                                                          
37 British Petroleum, special report on China, 2014. Retrieved from: 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/04/f30/China_International_Analysis_US.pdf 
 1990 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012* 2018** 
Production (mcm/y) 15300 27200 49320 94848 103100 109364 172728 
Demand (mcm/y) 15990 24503 46764 105526 130950 142000 295000 
Net Imports 
(mcm/y) 
690 2697 2556 10678 27850 32636 - 
Import Dependency 
(%) 
4 11 5 10 21 24 - 
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Table 2.2: Data on China’s natural gas38 
According to the forecasts the gas demand for 2018 is expected to increase from 
142 000 (mcm/y) to 295 000 (mcm/y). 
Secondly, China has already invested a huge amount of money to Turkmenistan 
and in the long-term Chinese will just continue on using the pipelines that it just finished 
building in this country. Thirdly, since the gas market is highly dependent on the global oil 
prices, market shocks may result in the change of the current energy scenario. Lastly, there 
are several scenarios that describe future of energy politics in China. One of them has to do 
with an expansion of shale gas market in US. China has not yet started to export the shale 
gas from United States, but with the technological advancement and if the prices for gas 
will not drop sharply, considering the continuation of the high demand in the country, 
there is potential that US will become next China’s trading partner. As for Central Asian 
region CNPC remains the major investing company in the Central Asian region, China was 
able to engage in bilateral negotiations with the countries in that region without the 
interference of Russia in their Scenario. Russia keeps their focus mainly on the European 
market and doesn’t intervene (at least for now) in the energy relations of China and Central 
Asian countries. Consequently, if the situation remains as it is, we will continue to observe 
China’s progress in terms of their diversification strategy of its internal energy market and 
suspect the sharp decrease in the coal consumption which should be at least partially 
replaced with natural gas market by 2020 
                                           
 
                                                          
38 IEA: International Energy Agency, data collected in 2012 
Natural gas in TPES 
(%) 
1 2 2 2 4 - - 
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                                                  CHAPTER 3 
Russian- Turkmen Gas Relations 
3.1 Gas Pipeline Network 
The gas pipeline structure inherited by Turkmenistan following the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union is mainly located in the east part of post-Soviet states.39 During the 
Soviet times, the ‘CENTER’ Central Asian Pipeline network was the major network 
connecting former Soviet Republics via Central Asia.40 Due to this former Soviet legacy 
and the way the pipeline structure has been built, has given Russia a leverage to control 
Turkmenistan’s gas market after the disintegration. In order to understand the 
transformation of Russo-Turkmen gas cooperation, it is important to examine how the 
usage of Central Asia ‘Center’ pipeline network has been transformed after Turkmenistan 
has become a sovereign state.  Before I start analyzing the pipeline connection with 
Turkmenistan and how it has changed, I will first look at the ‘Center gas pipeline’ in 
connection with the ‘pre-Caspian’ gas pipeline which is illustrated in the map 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
40 Ibid 
Map 3.1: Center Pipeline Network 
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          As it can be seen from the pipeline structure above, the Pre-Caspian gas pipeline has 
been connected through the Central Asia ‘Center’ network, which not only supplied 
Central Asian countries with gas but also has been a part of the pipeline route from 
Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to Russian soil crossing the Alexandrov Gai passage. 
Through this route, Turkmen gas was then redirected to the bigger pipeline web controlled 
by Moscow which eventually connects to the Russian-EU Gas pipeline structure. This 
pipeline structure still exists up until today but Turkmenistan, despite being a crucial 
potential gas exporter has been excluded from this gas network, due to the changes that 
have taken place in the Energy market as well as general economic changes since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
        To understand how Turkmenistan was excluded from the Russian gas alliance, it is 
necessary to look closer at the Turkmen-Russian energy relations which have prevailed 
since Turkmenistan’s independence in 1991. 
3.2 Turkmen-Russian relations during the early years of independence. 
 
       The transition period was the time which would determine the pattern of the Natural 
Gas export scenario in Turkmenistan.41 Due to the economic crisis in Central Asian 
countries following their independence and their inability to independently control the 
industrial sector inherited from the Soviet Union, there has been a significant decline in the 
gas demand42. One of the major challenges that Turkmenistan has faced has been the 
problem of the reimbursement for the gas sold to the former Soviet Union States.43  The 
state-planned economy of the FSU countries had been mainly based on the barter system, 
where one country would barter with another depending on the demand and supply which 
was controlled by Moscow. After the dissolution, Itera was an acting mediator regarding 
gas transit disputes in the FSU countries. Ukraine being a major importer of Turkmen gas 
                                                          
41  Vladimir Milov, “Ups and Downs of the Russia-Turkmenistan Relations,” in Russian Energy Security and Foreign 
Policy, ed. At Adrian  Dellecker and  Thomas Gomart (London: Routledge, 2011) 
42 Ibid 
43 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
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couldn’t pay the debt which Ashgabat had hoped on getting back.44  From time to time the 
Turkmen side had to freeze their exports as one of their strategies to pressure Ukraine to 
pay its debt which didn’t bring any significant results.45  
         In early 2000’s Gazprom replaced Itera with a different intermediary company, 
though the name of the company has remained.46 This replacement has played a significant 
role in the Turkmen export to Ukraine which I believe and served as an initial step for the 
process of elimination of Turkmen gas from the European gas market. When Gazprom 
became a major player in Russian gas industry, it signed an agreement with Naftogaz 
(Ukrainian Gas Company) and Eural Transgas was placed as an arbitrator. According to 
this agreement Turkmenistan was to export about 36 bcm of its gas to Ukraine using the 
existing pipeline structure from 2003-2006.47  At the same time, Russia started changing 
its attitude towards the Caspian by cutting the gas stream to the west and this way also 
illustrating its monopoly to the trading partners and lowering the expectations of the 
Caspian States. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union there have been minimal 
quotas established by Moscow, which distributed the amount of gas to each Soviet state in 
terms of how much gas they were allowed to sell abroad. In 1994 with the economic crisis 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union the quota system was reshaped giving the priority to 
the center and then allowing for the redistribution for the other states. Since Turkmenistan 
has significant gas reserves, it has been a primary competitor for Russian gas, which in the 
coming years with the leadership of Putin would result in tensions with the respect to 
bilateral relations of the two countries. 
                                                          
44 Ibid 
45 Pomfret, Richard. "Turkmenistan's Relations with Russia." Russian Analytical Digest, no. 71 (2010): 10-13. 
http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad/rad-all-issues.html 
46 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
47 Michael Fredholm, Natural-Gas Trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Agreements and Disputes 
(Stockholm University:Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Report 15, 2008). 
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3.3 Russo-Turkmen Gas transition 
         The inclusion of Itera as an intermediary dispute settling company between Russia- 
Ukraine and Turkmen gas sales has not been successful in settling the gas dispute between 
Ukraine and Turkmenistan thus resulting in a slow decline of Turkmen gas exports to the 
Ukrainian market, due to Ukraine’s inability to pay hard currency. Despite the fact that, 
according to the agreement only 40 percent was to be paid in hard cash while the rest of 
the payment through the barter food and other goods. Turkmenistan has nevertheless been 
excluded from the agreement before 2002-2003 Russian-Ukraine gas crisis. At the 
beginning it seemed like the inability of Ukraine to pay their gas bills was solely a 
Turkmen problem, yet in the coming years it would become evident that this problem has 
transferred into a Russian as well. After the first gas crisis with Ukraine, the share of the 
exports coming from Turkmenistan dropped to 6 bcm.48  In 2005 Ukraine could still buy 
gas from Turkmenistan directly, however, there were two obstacles that made this gas 
transaction impossible; first, Ukraine’s inability to pay its debts making it unfeasible for 
Turkmenistan to sign new trade deals with Ukraine and therefore complicating their 
bilateral gas trade relation. Fearing that the same would happen with the new contracts 
Turkmenistan stopped its transactions with Ukraine choosing to wait for at least a partial 
payment from the country.49 The second obstacle was a technical one, which had to do 
with the pipeline Central Asia ‘Center’ gas pipeline capacity.50 The contract was to 
purchase 40 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan and then 30 from Gazprom, yet what made 
this deal impossible, was the fact that the pipeline capacity was only for 45-50 bcm, which 
meant that Russia would use its monopoly to sell their gas and lower the flow of Turkmen 
gas to the West51. 
                                                          
48 Michael Fredholm, Natural-Gas Trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Agreements and Disputes 
(Stockholm University:Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Report 15, 2008). 
49  Global Witness, It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade (Washington, DC: Global Witness 
Publishing, April 2006,) 26. 
50  Gazoprovod Centralnaya Aziya- ‘Centr’: Mingas.ru 
51 Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiey I Turkmenistanom o sotrudnechestve v gazovoy otrasli, Moskva, Kreml’,  April 10, 2003  
(at Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, ww.ln.mid.ru) 
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 3.4 Beyond Energy Politics 
        Turkmenistan’s approach to Foreign Policy towards Russia has been drastically 
different from the other former Soviet Union Central Asian states. While other Eurasian 
states preferred being under Russian protection umbrella, Turkmenistan’s leaders chose a 
more dangerous route. In the first years of independence the main objective that Niyazov 
had was to completely free his state from all the Russian influence so that he would be able 
to control his country’s natural gas reserves without any Russian influence. Even when 
there was a security threat in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan sought to negotiate with the 
Taliban and partially with US rather than seeking assistance from Russia. The status of 
‘permanent neutrality’ gave Turkmenistan the grounds for isolationism from the 
international community. They have illustrated this position by not allowing Russia to 
participate in the 1996 Central Asian Summit and later by refusing to become a member of 
the Russian headed CIS organization.52 The dispute on the legal status of the Caspian sea 
was another issue in which Turkmenistan was not willing to comply with Russia and their 
allies to their disadvantaged position in the coast of the Caspian. 
(a) Russo-Turkmen Gas Contracts before 2009: Volumes 
       In order to contain Turkmenistan from selling their gas abroad, Russia had negotiated 
on a series of contracts which in the short term gave them a better deal than they had 
before. According to the official MFA estimates the long-term bilateral agreement of 2003 
has been structured as the following53: 
 
 
                                                          
52 Rumer, Boris Z. Central Asia and the new global economy. ME Sharpe, 2000. 
53 Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiey I Turkmenistanom o sotrudnechestve v gazovoy otrasli, Moskva, Kreml’,  April 10, 2003  
(at Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, ww.ln.mid.ru) 
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 Table 3.1: Russian-Turkmen bilateral Agreement: Volume 
The graph above illustrates the amount of bcm that Moscow had agreed to purchase 
starting from 2006. I have specifically selected the date starting from 2006 due to the 
significant changes (when compared to earlier years) in demand and gas purchase. 
 1980 2004 2010 2015 2030 2004-
2030 
Russia n.a 420 469 503 582 1.3 
European 
Union 
n.a 508 560 609 726 1.4 
Table 3.2: World Primary Natural Gas Demand Scenario in bcm (2006) 
         As the table 3.2 clearly shows, starting from 2004 to 2010, European demand has 
increased by 52 bcm in total and Russia’s own demand has increased by 49 bcm during the 
same period. According to the same year World Energy Outlook report, the supply of the 
European Union at that time was -214 bcm which meant that Russia needed and additional 
supply source that Turkmenistan was willing to provide. As I have mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, even though Russia was aiming to purchase a maximum of 80 bcm 
between 2009-2028, in reality, due to the low capacity of the pipeline network (which 
could only carry up until 40 bcm per year), it had to nevertheless limit their purchases. In 
2006 10 bcm 
2007 60-70 
bcm 
2008 63-73 
bcm 
2009-
2028 
70-80 
bcm 
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fact, according to the estimates Russia has never imported more than 45 bcm in spite of the 
initial agreement.54  
3.5 Russo- Turkmen Gas Contract before 2009: Prices 
        Although Russia has increased the amount of gas it was buying from Turkmenistan, 
the pricing has been a long standing issue for Ashgabat. There are several reasons that 
made the pricing procedure rather complicated, first, in the beginning the gas trade 
continued with the old pricing system and Turkmenistan didn’t have enough to renegotiate 
the price that had been set, and second, the transition process gave Russia an advantage to 
set their own price to their FSU partners. Russia’s main strategy was buying Turkmen gas 
for less money and reselling this gas to Europe for much higher price. In 2004, with the 
increasing oil and gas demand in Europe there was a dramatic increase in gas prices.55 
Considering the dramatic changes in market, Turkmenistan sought this opportunity to 
renegotiate the gas prices with Russia. In the first round of the negotiations, Ashgabat’s 
first demand was that Moscow was to pay twice of the initial price and in cash instead of 
partial barter. In the beginning, neither Russia nor Ukraine was willing to increase the 
price, and so the result Turkmenistan had to cut their gas deliveries on December 31, 2004. 
Due to the high European demand Russia had to negotiate to fulfill the supply gap which 
has led to the new adjusted pricing scheme for Turkmen gas as illustrated. (Table 3.3) 
 
 
  
Table 3.3:  Gas Supply Prices from Turkmenistan to Russia 2005-2009 
                                                          
54 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
55 Michael Fredholm, Natural-Gas Trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Agreements and Disputes 
(Stockholm University:Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Report 15, 2008). 
Supply Periods, year  Gas supply price, US$/ tcm 
2005 44 (in cash) 
2006 65 
2007 100 
2007 (November) 130 
2008- 2009 150 
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3.6 Economic Crisis of 2009 
         After the European Union released its ‘Second Strategic Energy Review’ in 2008, 
Russian foreign and domestic gas demand started to decline rapidly.56 Some authors claim 
that Russian- Ukrainian gas disputes have played a significant role in the European 
decision to diversify their energy routes, leading them negotiate with the countries such as 
Libya and Algeria. This meant that Russia could no longer maintain the capacities and the 
prices that it had agreed upon with Turkmenistan in 2008 and earlier.57 On April 11 2009, 
Turkish news agency Hurriyet reported that there was a pipeline explosion on the 
Dowletabad-Dariyalyk (CAC-4) pipeline on the Turkmen-Uzbek border; this was the 
pipeline that had been transferring Turkmen Gas to Russia58. According to the reports 
provided by Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs the reason for the explosion was 
the dramatic drop in gas demand, which the Russian side ‘irresponsibly’ cut without 
notifying Turkmen side. Ashgabat failed to control the pipeline pressure which led to the 
rupture of the pipeline59. This became a critical juncture in Turkmen-Russian gas relations 
transforming the further gas trade scenario between the two countries. 
3.7 New wave of Turkmen-Russian relations 2009-2016 
        It took two sides almost nine months to settle the gas argument; the final agreement 
was made only towards the end of the year (22 December 2009), which meant that the 
trade could be resumed from the beginning of the next year.60 After the incident, Gazprom 
could now dictate its own rules just like it had after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
negotiation terms that were unilaterally imposed on Turkmenistan illustrate one of the 
                                                          
56 Horák, Slavomír. "Turkmenistan’s Shifting Energy Geopolitics in 2009-2011." Problems of Post-Communism 59, no. 
2 (2012): 18-30. doi:10.2753/ppc1075-8216590202. 
57  Ibid 
58 Huriiyet Archive “Turkmenistan Blames Russia for pipeline blast”, from Reuters April 11, 2009 Retrieved from: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkmenistan-blames-russia-for-pipeline-blast-11409332 
59  Bruce Pannier, Pipeline Explosion Raises Tensions between Turkmenistan, Russia, April 14, 2009. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rferl.org/a/Pipeline_Explosion_Stokes_Tensions_Between_Turkmenistan_Russia/1608633.html 
 
60 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
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major issues in the bilateral agreement, which is the reliability of the sides. Russia has 
proposed two scenarios from which Turkmenistan could choose:  
 First scenario: volumes of exports would remain the same, but the price would be cut by 
40 percent.61 
 Second scenario: prices would remain the same; the exports would be cut by 80 percent.62 
        After the round of negotiations, Turkmenistan was able to get a relatively fair deal, 30 
bcm of gas would be delivered through the long term contract between 2010-2028.63 On 
the price side, Turkmenistan was able to negotiate the number close to EU market prices, 
which in 2010 was 250 USD per tcm.64 The exports resumed in the beginning of January 
2010, estimated exports were about 11 bcm for that year.65 From that day Russian-
Turkmen gas imports have been transformed in following way: 
Years 2010-
2014 
2015 2016 
Bcm 10-11 4 0 
  Table 3.4: Changes in Export Scenario between Russia and Turkmenistan 2014-201666 
        In 2015 the European gas market was continuing its successful progress towards the 
efficient use of energy by switching to the renewable energy market and by starting to 
decrease its energy dependency on Russia. Consequently, there was a fall in Russian 
                                                          
61 Bruce Pannier, “Medvedev Brings a Strong Hand to Gas Negotiations with Turkmenistan”, Radio Free Europe Liberty, 
22October,2010.Retrievedfrom: 
https://www.rferl.org/a/Medvedev_Brings_A_Strong_Hand_To_Gas_Negotiations_With_Turkmenistan/2196378.html 
62 Vasánczki, Luça Zs. "Gas exports in Turkmenistan." Paris, Ifri (2011). 
63 Ibid 
64 Michael Fredholm, Natural-Gas Trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Agreements and Disputes 
(Stockholm University:Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Report 15, 2008). 
65 Ibid 
66 Exeter Central Asian Studies Network 2016 
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supply to the European gas market. This meant that Russia didn’t need Turkmen gas 
anymore. As a result of the significant oil price drop in December 2015, Russia lowered its 
purchases from Turkmenistan to 4 bcm per year.67The same year Russian Gazprom filed a 
lawsuit against Turkmenistan in the arbitrary court of Stockholm over the gas prices.68 
Several news agencies have speculated that Russia demanded that Turkmengaz reimburse 
5 billion dollars to Gazprom for the losses it suffered from falling prices and a decrease in 
demand to Europe.69 
       In January 2016, Interfax reported on the termination of Gazprom’s contract with 
Turkmengaz State Concern.70 Russian side blamed Turkmen government of serious 
violations of the bilateral agreement and for the first time was asking for the retroactive 
revision of the gas trade of the two countries contracts between 2010-2015. According to 
Bruce Pannier71 there was a political motive behind the termination of the contract. 
However, due to transparency issues between the two states, we can only speculate about 
the reasons behind this termination. Since 2016, there have been no significant changes in 
the bilateral gas trade between Turkmenistan and Russia. 
       To conclude, it could be said that with the current state of European gas demand the 
possibility of cooperation between Turkmenistan and Russia seems highly unlikely. 
Another factor which makes Russian Gazprom unattractive is the irregularity of Russia as 
a gas partner. On the other hand while Russia has been a long standing gas partner for 
Turkmenistan, the state lost from this dispute amounts only 4 bcm of the total profit which 
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can potentially be mitigated by other alternative routes. Consequently, the termination of 
the contract in 2016 has only strengthened Turkmenistan’s plans to diversify its gas routes 
towards Eastern direction. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Iran’s Gas Demand and Gas Trade with Turkmenistan 
4.1 Geopolitics of the two countries 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran became one of Turkmenistan’s 
major partners in the Energy cooperation. The two countries have been able to establish 
stronger relations as compared to any other Central Asian states. Geopolitically, Iran plays 
an important role due to fact that it shares a common state border with Turkmenistan 
which is about 1000 km long, making the trade relations easier due to the availability of 
land transportation.72 
  
Map 4.1: Map of Turkmenistan 
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Another geopolitical advantage shaping Turkmen-Iran trade relations is the fact that the 
capital city Ashgabat is located very close to the Iran border (see map 4.1) making railroad 
transit easier. 
4.2 Turkmenistan-Iran Cooperation 
The first decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan was 
desperately seeking for alternative routes for their gas exports. The first steps of 
cooperation with Iran started with the transmission of electricity and the building of the 
electricity grid, which was the only grid that started to provide electricity to the Northern 
provinces of Iran. Gas exports were also within the scope of the Energy cooperation 
between the two countries. In the beginning of 2000s, Iran began to import gas from 
Turkmenistan to the northern part of the country.73 Iran soon became one of the vital 
energy partners of Turkmenistan. In 2015 when Russia decreased its purchases from 11 
bcm to 4 bcm, Turkmenistan’s dependency on Iran as the gas importer increased. As a 
result Iran became the second major importer of Turkmen gas.74 
4.3 Turkmenistan-Iran Gas Pipelines 
There are a total of two pipelines that connect Turkmenistan and Iran. These two 
pipelines provide access to the energy for the Northern region of Iran where there are 
substantial shortages in energy sources and a lack of internal gas infrastructure. The 
Korpeje-Kurkui pipeline was launched in 1997 with a total capacity of 8 bcm per year.75 
According to the Eurasian Research Institute, this pipeline was the first successful project 
that provided Turkmenistan with an alternative energy route aside from the Russian 
pipeline network. Since then the gas trade of the two countries has been increasing. It 
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became clear that the cooperation between the two parties was solely based on the mutual 
energy interest. Due to the successful launching of the first pipeline and the seemingly 
satisfactory agreement of 1997, the two parties decided to launch a second pipeline in 
response to the rising demand in the Northern provinces of Iran. In 2010, 182 km long 
Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran gas pipeline was launched.76 Initially, the total capacity of 
the pipeline was 12 bcm per year. After the additional compressor was added the pipeline, 
the capacity increased up to 20 bcm annually by December 2013.77 According to the 
contract Iran was supposed to buy 14 bcm of gas per year, though the reports say that 
Turkmenistan has only supplied about 7.5 bcm of gas to Iran in 2013 and 2014. The 
following graph illustrates the import and export gas scenario of Iran until 201478: 
 
Figure 4.1: Iran’s natural gas pipeline imports and exports 
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As we can see from the figure 4.1, the gas import of the country has been increasing 
from 2009 to 2013. With the launch of the second pipeline we can see that in 2011 the gas 
imports have been the highest and in 2012 and 2013 it started to fall. There is only one 
explanation behind the decrease in the gas imports of the country when Turkmenistan’s 
capacity was increasing. One of the key reasons for the low level of imports is the 
economic sanctions imposed against Iran.79 The figure 4.2 is illustrating the economic 
sanctions pattern in Iran starting from January, 2011. 
 
Figure 4.2: Monthly Iranian petroleum and other liquids production 
After the US imposed economic sanctions on the Iran’s Central Bank in 2011 it also 
disconnected Iranian banks from the International Transaction system, SWIFT. This meant 
that Iran could no longer make international transfers from its national savings.80  Inability 
to pay because of the frozen bank accounts have transformed into National debt. 
According to estimates the debt that Tehran owed Turkmenistan was more than 1 billion 
                                                          
79 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Short-term Energy Outlook 2016”: Iran’s Petroleum Production Expected 
to increase after sanctions are lifted. Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24592# 
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USD in 2013, which started to create tensions that resulted in current gas scenario between 
the two states. 
4.4 Gas Prices  
The lack of transparency on the gas trade prices makes it difficult to foretell the 
dynamics of the gas import-export strategies between the two countries. Even though 
Turkmenistan-Iran gas negotiations are kept secret, Iranian media outlets argue that 
according to the agreements of 2005 the prices were approximately $75 per tcm. 
According to the Azerbaijani media outlets, Iran has paid Turkmenistan $515 tcm during 
2013.81 Despite these figures, one of the main challenges that we face when understanding 
the trade dynamics between the two is the barter side of the agreement that we don’t have 
any estimates for. Iran’s state officials have claimed that the half of the price have been 
already paid through barter of goods.82 Even though it is known that Turkmenistan has 
been pressuring Iran to pay its debts, we don’t know the exact amount of the barter 
included in the unofficial deal and the amount of cash that Iran owed Turkmenistan since 
the installment of sanctions on the state. 
4.5 Current gas Trade dynamics 
In the beginning of 2016 the sanctions that had been imposed on Iran for the past 
decade were lifted.83 For Turkmenistan this meant that the debt of more than 1 billion USD 
that Iran owed Ashgabat would soon be paid (at least that is what Turkmen officials have 
been expecting). On December 31, on the New Year’s Eve a number of news agencies 
reported that Turkmenistan had halted their gas exports to Iran.84  The next day 
Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that TurkmenGaz had suspended 
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exports due to the ongoing payment dispute.85 Turkmenistan’s officials claimed that the 
total amount of debt that Iran owes Turkmenistan has exceeded 4.5 billion USD.  On the 
other hand, Iran national Gas Company claimed that the inability to pay this debt was 
mainly due to the sanctions imposed since 2011. Moreover, Iran’s officials have also 
claimed that they have paid more than a half of their debt through goods and services.86 
Both of the sides have applied to arbitrary courts and up until now the dispute have not 
been settled. 
Conclusion: 
To conclude this chapter, it could be said that Iran has been a vital partner in Energy 
Cooperation with Turkmenistan. Moreover, the lifting of sanctions has opened up 
possibilities for the future prospects of new energy projects between the two countries. 
Notwithstanding the current disputes between the two sides, I believe that the probability 
of the permanent termination of the gas contracts between the two states is relatively low.  
This projection can be made mainly due to Turkmenistan’s decrease in total number of gas 
exports which was caused by the termination of Gazprom’s contract. Furthermore, since 
Turkmenistan remains the only alternative for Iran to supply its Northern provinces with 
gas, makes Iran willing to maintain good relations with its neighbor. As a result we can 
expect a resolution that will serve the mutual benefit and continue the symbiotic 
relationship between the two neighboring countries. 
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CHAPTER 5 
                                     Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea 
  In the early 1990’s when the post-Soviet Caspian states started to gain their 
independence, the dispute on Caspian status became a salient topic for the littoral states87. 
With the formation of four newly emerged Caspian states, each of them started to form 
their own opinion about the future of the Caspian basin. During the time when 
Turkmenistan was a part of USSR, the republic wasn’t really interested on the broader 
status of the Caspian unlike Azerbaijan whose proven oil and gas reserves were discovered 
during Soviet geological explorations.  
The first division of Caspian took place in 1970.88 Before that there had been two 
agreements on the status of the Caspian signed between the Soviet Union and Iran in 1921 
and 1940, respectively.89 This division took a rather symbolic character than a practical 
one, since four of the countries at that time were part of a single republic.90 The newly 
emerged post-Soviet Caspian states (with the exception of Russia) declared non-
recognition of the previous legal contracts signed in a bilateral manner between Iran and 
the Soviet Union.91 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990’s 
there have been a number of negotiation rounds to determine the legal status of the 
Caspian.92 
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5.1 How did it start? 
 The question on whether the Caspian Sea is sea or a lake has been disputed for more 
than two decades. The reason why Caspian legal status plays a crucial role is if it is 
accepted as a sea, the UNCLOS has to be applied.93 On the other hand if the Caspian is 
accepted as a lake then the issue will become even more controversial, taking into 
consideration the non-existence of international law on the status of lakes. Mammedov 
(2002) in his chapter has divided these negotiation rounds into three stages; the 
investigation period (1991-1994), the brainstorming period (1995-1999) and the last 
period, from the time Putin came to power up until now94. 
i. First round of negotiations: It could be argued that the first round was mainly led by 
Iran.95 During that time Russia remained inactive and took the role of an observer rather 
than an active participant, which gave other Caspian states an opportunity to openly 
express their opinions regarding the division of the Caspian96. Iran also saw this as a 
chance to propose  the creation of the Organization of the Caspian States Cooperation 
under the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization). The purpose of this organization 
was to promote the multilateral cooperation regarding the trade matters (fishing, marine 
security etc.) of the Caspian. In the first round Turkmen delegation applied their 
isolationist strategy illustrating utter indifference towards the issues that were discussed in 
the conference.97  
 
ii. Second round of Multilateral Negotiations: In this stage the international community 
expressed their support for the determination of the legal status of Caspian.98 The main 
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objective in the second stage negotiation was the Russian led project ‘On preservation and 
use of biological resources in Caspian.’99 The topics on boundaries of fishery and 
preservation of bio-diversity in the Caspian were essential topics of discussion in this 
round.100 Nevertheless, the agreement was not signed, due to the fact that Azerbaijan did 
not agree upon the 20 mile fishery zone as a result which the finalization of the agreement  
was postponed for further discussion.101 It should be noted that Turkmenistan didn’t attend 
the last round of meetings. I think that the main reason why Turkmenistan took some of 
the meetings for granted was the difficulty the leadership faced in selecting their grand 
strategy on their role in the region. The inability of the Caspian leaders to negotiate in a 
multilateral manner has resulted in a number of bilateral agreements. As a result, the 
conclusion of the second round brought even more controversies in terms of the Caspian 
Status which prolonged the debate on the Caspian to the third round. 
iii. Third round of multilateral cooperation: When Putin came to power, as a first step he 
expressed his special interest in the Caspian region102. As a second step, he appointed 
Kaluzhnyy (ex-head of Gazprom) as a special permanent representative of the President in 
the regulation of the Caspian dispute.103 Putin took a pragmatic approach in solving the 
Caspian dispute suggesting the sea should be divided into national sectors.104 Putin’s 
attempt to solve this issue very quickly resulted in more controversies, thereby prolonging 
the negotiation process even further. 
As for today, the recent negotiation process has not brought any substantial changes that 
could help solve the problem of Caspian’s legal status. 
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5.2 Caspian Reserves 
The last report on hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian was published by EIA in 
2012. According to the estimates published by EIA there were a total of 7.6 bcm of oil and 
around 8.3 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves surrounding the Caspian Sea area.105 The 
2012 report by EIA is the only special report published by the Agency on the Caspian 
region. There are no other official reports as of yet.  According to EIA, most of the proved 
natural reserves are mainly located in South of the Caspian Basin106. Due to the fact that 
the legal status of the Caspian is still not resolved, the offshore exploration in the area is 
limited.107 According the explorations by Turkmen geologists and US Western Geco the 
estimated amount of gas reserves in early 2000’s were 6.5 trillion cubic meters108. This 
means in 12 years the capacity of proven reserves has increased by 1.8 tcm.  The 
distribution of proven and probable offshore reserves combined per country is illustrated in 
the table above. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Lukin.O “The future for gas in Turkmenistan’s portion of Caspian” published on July 2011. Retrieved from: 
http://legacy.interfaxenergy.com/natural-gas-news-analysis/russia-and-the-caspian/the-future-for-gas-in-
turkmenistan%E2%80%99s-portion-of-the-caspian-sea/ 
106 “Oil and natural gas production Is growing in Caspian Sea region”  September, 2013 published by: EIA  
107  Ibid 
108 Lukin.O “The future for gas in Turkmenistan’s portion of Caspian” published on July 2011. Retrieved from: 
http://legacy.interfaxenergy.com/natural-gas-news-analysis/russia-and-the-caspian/the-future-for-gas-in-
turkmenistan%E2%80%99s-portion-of-the-caspian-sea/ 
Figure 5.1: Caspian Reserves1 
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One of the offshore fields near village Kyyanly in Turkmenbashy (next to the 
Caspian) is known as Magtymguly. The Malaysian company Petronas started the gas 
treatment on that field in 2011. According to Lukin’s (2011) report, the annual capacity of 
this gas field was about 5 bcm with the potential of being expanded via compressors to 10 
bcm109. As of 2012 according to the table above the proven and probable offshore natural 
gas reserves in total is estimated to be 112 trillion cubic feet. The highest reserves in the 
Caspian belong to Kazakhstan with a total of 36 tcf of proven and probable reserves, while 
Turkmenistan sums up only to 9 tcf of gas in the region110. In the comparative terms 
Russian total reserves are estimated at 1,688 trillion cubic feet as for January 2015111. 
The chapter on Caspian illustrates the significance in terms of current and potential 
reserves. When compared to the energy giants like Russia the 112 trillion feet is not a 
small number. Moreover what makes Caspian more attractive is not only the amount of 
reserves it possesses, but the geographical location. Being a bridge between Central Asia, 
Caucasus to Europe makes the basin an important alternative for seeking a new energy 
supplier to Europe. However due to the fact that Turkmenistan is located across the 
Caspian makes it impossible for Turkmenistan to send their gas resources independently 
hence, the only way for Turkmenistan to export across the Caspian is to make a deal with 
Azerbaijan, the attempts on negotiations between the two parties are  going to be examined 
in the next part.  
5.3 Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
The Trans- Caspian pipeline is one of the proposed pipeline routes in the Southern 
Gas Corridor that was supposed to start from Turkmenistan’s Cheleken field, going 
                                                          
109 Lukin.O “The future for gas in Turkmenistan’s portion of Caspian” published on July 2011. Retrieved from: 
http://legacy.interfaxenergy.com/natural-gas-news-analysis/russia-and-the-caspian/the-future-for-gas-in-
turkmenistan%E2%80%99s-portion-of-the-caspian-sea/ 
110 Ibid 
111 Gazprom “Russian total gas reserves in Caspian basin” Retrieved from: http://www.gazprom.ru/ 
49 
 
through South Caucasus region and then connecting to Turkey as a transit route (Nabucco 
route) and finally supplying gas to European Gas market.112  
 Initially the idea of Trans-Caspian pipeline was proposed by two USA based 
companies Bechel and General Electric in 1998.113  Both EU and Turkey were interested in 
this project; European Union wanted to limit Russian monopoly on gas imports to EU and 
Turkey on the other hand wanted to fulfill their rising gas demand with affordable gas 
route. Both USA and Turkey have agreed to provide the project with the necessary support 
in terms of the financing. As a result, a 30 year agreement was signed between Turkey and 
Turkmenistan in 1999. While the project seemed feasible at the time, the discovery of 
Shah Deniz field provided Turkey with a cheaper alternative for Turkish gas import which 
making inclusion of Turkmen gas expensive and disadvantageous.114 
 Russia’s response to these negotiations was the proposal of an alternative route 
bypassing the Baltic Sea, the Nord Stream pipeline.115 The total capacity of the stream was 
projected to 55 bcm of gas per year.116 The pipeline was successfully launched in 2011 
with the joint venture of Gazprom, Wintershall and Uniper supplying Europe without 
being dependent on Ukraine as a transit country. According to Gazprom reports after the 
examination on the feasibility in 2012, Nord Stream 2 is projected to be put in to operation 
sometime before late 2019.117 
Despite the fact that the Nord Stream project was signed in 2000, the first 
negotiation process on Nabucco began in 2002.  Following negotiations Ukraine-Russian 
dispute took place in 2006 (when Russia cut its gas supplies to Europe in the middle of 
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winter) made the South Stream project even more attractive. 118 According to estimates, 
the total capacity of Nabucco pipeline would be about 31 bcm per year, which only equals 
to 1 percent of European total demand. The map bellow illustrates the complete picture of 
the South stream project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5.1: South stream pipeline 119 
The Nabucco project has been officially aborted in 2013 with the decision of the 
Azerbaijani officials. However from the reports the fate of Nabucco has been determined 
earlier in 2011, when the Shah Deniz Consortium excluded the whole big Nabucco project 
due to the lack of available gas for transit which had to be up to 31 bcm.120On the other 
                                                          
118 Baran, Zeyno. "Security Aspects of South Stream project." 
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hand if the demand of Eastern Central Europe will rise after 2020 they would potentially 
be still interested in Turkmenistan’s gas. But since the status of the Caspian hasn’t been 
resolved for the past two decades the feasibility of this pipeline is very limited. 
To sum up, it could be said that the Trans-Caspian project under umbrella of greater 
Nabucco at current stage is not probable. Leaving aside the challenges of technicalities of 
building the pipeline across the Caspian, one of the major problems that remain is the 
unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea. Without the joint agreement of all sides, the 
dispute is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. As for nowadays, it has been more 
than two decades since the dispute was first put on the negotiation table. And perhaps it is 
in this light that Niyazov was right by saying that ‘The Caspian smells of blood.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
Scenarios for future geopolitical transition in Turkmenistan 
6.1 Ongoing and Future Projects 
Since Gazprom’s departure from Turkmenistan and the negotiation outcomes with 
Iran remain unclear, the only country that de facto continues to buy Turkmen gas is China. 
While China’s demands remain high enough for the continued purchasing of gas at a stable 
rate, there is still a need for the diversification of gas routes so as to prevent future 
monopolization by China. This chapter will list and classify the alternative gas pipeline 
projects that could potentially diversify and shift current geopolitical scenarios for 
Turkmenistan. I will list the desirable projects that Turkmenistan is interested in, and 
outline the number of factors that tend to prevent these projects from becoming a reality. 
This chapter will present a total of three alternative pipeline projects that Turkmenistan has 
hoped to sign following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  This sixth chapter will 
divide these projects in two categories; the realized projects vs Turkmen dreams. The 
projects of pipeline routes that are going to be discussed are the following: TAPI, Central 
Asia- China pipeline (and the updates) and Iran as a potential LNG hub. 
6.2 Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – Iran Pipeline (TAPI) 
Initially the project was proposed in the mid-1990s. The 1500 km gas pipeline to be 
constructed from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, at that time the initiative came 
from the ‘Unocal 74’ which is a US based oil company.121 However according to Bohr 
(2003)122 this company was suspended mainly due to its engagement in the fighting with 
Taliban- controlled Afghanistan. Author claims that after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Niyazov retained friendly relations with Taliban mainly due to the inability to 
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secure its country on the Afghan-Turkmen border with its own military.123 Then there 
followed the tragedy of September 11, 2001 and it became clear that Afghanistan needed 
to be stabilized before this project could be brought to the table of negotiations. 
 
In 2002 when the Taliban was weakened, Turkmenistan sought the opportunity to 
review the TAPI pipeline project again. The project was planned to start from the 
Galkynysh field from Mary region with total reserves of 13100 bcm up to Pakistan’s 
network in Multan and continue on to Fazilka in India. The map below illustrates the route 
map of the project. 
  
Map 6.1: TAPI Pipeline124 
In 2002, Niyazov proposed this project to UN requesting money to finance this 
project125. The main argument proposed by the leader at that time was that the gas pipeline 
was ‘the only hope’ for Afghanistan to diversify their economy and decrease its 
dependence on drug exports.126 By the end of the summer of the same year, US agreed to 
provide the technical support for the project and the World Bank, the Asian Development 
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Bank and Japanese owned Itochu Company also expressed their interest in financially 
supporting and providing technical assistance for the project.127 Despite the financial 
assistance, the project hasn’t been put in place immediately after the negotiation rounds 
with UN ended. The death of Niyazov had put hold in the negotiation process. 
 
After Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov came to power in 2007, 
he resumed the negotiation rounds. At last, according to the Middle East press the project 
has been officially resumed and launched on December 2015.128 The four leaders of the 
countries officially signed the launch of 10 billion dollar contract on December 15, 2015.  
 
According to media sources, Turkmenistan will cover almost 85 percent of the total cost 
of the project.129 Out of these approximately 51 percent (out of the 85) will be provided 
with funds and the rest 34 percent is going to be arranged by different financiers.130 Asian 
Development Bank has already offered 1 billion dollar loan, Islamic Development bank 
has offered 500 million dollars for the project.131 Even though the project does seem 
feasible at first sight there are certain challenges that may change the fate of this project. 
 
Possible Challenges 
i. Security Challenges: Since Niyazov’s term, one of the major obstacles that remain in the 
construction of this project is the instability of Afghanistan. Even though from 2003 there 
is a reported progress on the stability of the country, it is still difficult to say how stable it 
actually is. While there are assumptions that Niyazov had friendly relations with Taliban, 
we cannot be sure of the current’s leader’s negotiations with the Taliban. But what we do 
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know from the history is that terrorists tend to target pipelines to send a massage.  
Especially after the recent reports by the opposition of the insurgencies taking place on the 
Turkmen-Afghan border,132 the question of security remains a major obstacle for this 
pipeline.133 
ii. Pakistan’s Domestic insurgency: The guerilla war waged by Baluchistan nationalists 
against the government of Pakistan in Baluchistan is another threat to the pipeline. Baloch 
nationalists could also potentially target TAPI to achieve their political means.  
iii. India-Pakistan conflict: India-Pakistan relationship could also potentially become an 
obstacle for the project. If the disagreement occurs between the two countries this could 
create greater long-term problems for the implementation of the project. 
iv. Lastly, the security risks may increase the cost of the project. In the early 2000’s the cost 
of the project was estimated to be around 7.5 billion dollars.134 During the last course of 
negotiations it has increased to 10 billion without making additional provisions for security 
related construction costs. From the financial outline we can see that none of the 
multinational companies could come to agreement for the finances for this project, after 
which the leaders decided to launch it with their own resources. This means that security 
risks mentioned earlier would increase the cost of the project, thereby affecting its 
feasibility. 
To conclude, it could be said while TAPI remains one of the biggest dreams of 
Turkmen leaders, the above mentioned issues puts the feasibility of the project in doubt. 
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6.3 Central Asia – China Pipeline 
In the mid 2000’s Russia was trying to do all it can to contain the Nabbuco and 
trans-Caspian pipeline meanwhile China’s natural gas demand had been growing. The 
talks on the construction of this pipeline started in 2006. The Central Asia-China pipeline 
project was initially divided in to four Lines (A,B,C,D), out of which Line A was launched 
in December 2009 with the total capacity of 15 bcm per year.135 Line B was completed the 
next year in October 2010 also with the capacity of 15 bcm per year.136 According to the 
agreement with CNPC, the Line C opened in May, 2014.  The CNPC official web side 
reported that in 2015, the exports of the Line C increased to 25 bcm per year.137  
 
Map 6.2: Central Asia – China Gas Pipeline138 
The three lines are indicated on the Map 6.2.139 The next plan is to build the two 
compressors that would increase the capacity of the three lines; however, the total amount 
of the capacity that is going to be increased is still unknown. 
Possible Challenges: Since the pipeline has been already built, there are no significant 
challenges that could potentially disturb the agreement. The only significant change that 
has occurred in this pipeline network was back to back delays in the construction of the D 
line that happened in 2016 and 2017 respectively.140  
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 Map 6.3: Central Asia – China Pipeline Lines 
 As it could be seen from the Map 6.3 the Line D would have completed the pipeline 
network by extending from Turkmenistan and passing through Uzbekistan- Tajikistan-
Kyrgyzstan to China’s Wuqia province. However, with another delay of the project, it now 
depends on China’s demands and whether or not China would still be willing to continue 
this project.  
 
6.4 Iran as an LNG Hub 
 
As it has been mentioned in the fourth chapter, Iran imports gas from Turkmenistan 
from two pipelines from two different gas fields, one of the gas fields that Iran purchases 
the gas from is Dauletabad field. This pipeline connects to the Northern part of Iran in city 
called Mashad which is located in the Northern part of Iran. As I have mentioned earlier 
the Dauletabads field’s total gas reserve is estimated to be 1,200 bcm, and Iran 12 bcm per 
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year.141 The total capacity of the pipeline after the installation of the compressors is 20 
bcm.142 The Dauletabad- Sarakhs- Khangiran gas field can be seen from the map in the 
next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Map 6.4: Iran Domestic Pipeline Map 
Taking into consideration the increasing share of LNG in global gas trade, given the 
lower cost of liquefication and LNG transport, one of the possibilities for Turkmenistan 
and Iran to diversify their routes could be a creation of an LNG hub. The LNG hub would 
potentially start from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad field go through Iran’s Mashad and 
extend from North to South thus, forming an LNG hub in the Gulf. The map of the 
pipeline and the hub could be as the following: 
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Map 6.5: Potential LNG hub 
Possible Challenges: First challenge is the issue of finding sponsors interested in 
potentially financing and contributing to the technical assistance of this project. Since the 
liquefaction process becoming cheaper and LNG is becoming more affordable than the 
conventional gas, both China and India would benefit from this hub since there will be no 
need for the pipeline construction.  On the other hand, the construction of the long pipeline 
from Turkmenistan across Iran to the Gulf will involve substantial investment, apart from 
ownership of the pipeline and transit agreements with Iran. Moreover, in order for 
Turkmenistan to enjoy the benefits of an access to LNG export terminal in the Gulf, there 
needs to be a contractual agreement with Iran in respect to the ownership and operation of 
such a terminal as part, possibly, of a hub that is fed by Turkmen- Iranian gas jointly.  
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If China’s demand continues to increase, then financing the LNG hub might become 
more beneficial than constructing another long-term natural gas pipeline. It should be 
noted that LNG doesn’t necessarily bind a country with a long term agreement since it can 
be transported via water. While the land pipeline infrastructure requires not only 
commitment but does not allow flexibility of export destination. 
 Second challenge is the unstable relationship between Iran and Turkmenistan. It is 
still not clear whether the two countries will come to an agreement after the recent gas cut 
by Turkmenistan. The end result of the debt dispute between the two countries is an 
essential element that will determine the viability of this project.  
 According to some analysts, the third challenge is the ‘Maritime piracy’. There have 
been both reported and unreported attacks by pirates in the Arabian Gulf. 143 The research 
on the topic of pirates in the Gulf has already illustrated the severity of the problem. 
According to reports by maritime police, one of the major threats posed by pirates is 
blocking access in and out of the Gulf.144 This involves the possible attacks on the oil 
cargo ships causing economic loss not only to the supplying side but the purchaser as well. 
To sum up, out of the three possible scenarios proposed in this chapter, the project 
on China is the only project that has already been launched and continues to operate. Iran’s 
project is only a hypothetical one that hasn’t been yet put on the negotiation table, and 
after the lifting of sanctions, Iran’s likelihood in engaging in the proposed project is 
questionable. Finally, while the leaders of TAPI pipeline seem to be very optimistic about 
the project, I still believe that the issue of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan may result 
in unforeseen challenges possibly leading to the failure of the project. 
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CONCLUSION 
Natural gas remains a vital source of Turkmenistan’s national income which makes 
the country dependent on the high gas demand of purchasing countries. The purpose of this 
thesis was to provide an answer for the following questions: The future role of 
Turkmenistan in the international market for gas, and the factors restraining Turkmenistan 
from diversifying its natural gas routes. Prior research has mainly focused on factors such 
as failed institutions, isolationism, regime type and lack of transparency, my research has 
illustrated that there is another factor that limits the external sales of the gas abroad which 
is the geopolitics of a given country. From a geopolitical standpoint, there are three major 
dynamics at play: post-Soviet legacy, neighboring hegemony, and cross national borders. 
Additionally, this work identifies the handicaps bilateral agreements with major Turkmen 
gas importing states and revises the future scenarios for potential partners. 
The first chapter of this thesis aimed at providing a general overview of the 
abundance of natural resources in the country. This chapter provided a graphic description 
of the fully developed and undeveloped gas fields. Additionally, it gave a detailed 
description of each reserve basin, its location and its total reserve capacity with a view to 
illustrating, Turkmenistan’s natural gas export potential. The last part of this chapter 
reviewed all major companies that have invested in pipeline constructions and currently 
are benefiting from gas exports coming from Turkmenistan. The main conclusion to be 
drawn from the first chapter is the lagging upstream investments that hamper the 
advantageous exploitation of Turkmenistan’s substantial natural gas resources where only 
two of the existing sixteen gas fields are producing, while the other fourteen remain 
dormant.   
Since China is the major importer of Turkmenistan’s gas, this chapter provided a 
detailed analysis on changes in the energy policies of China and its gradual transformation 
from coal dependence to cleaner sources of energy in particular natural gas. The aim of the 
chapter was to explain the transition phase and the introduction of the coal reduction 
policy in China which has boosted demand for imports of natural gas. I have reviewed 
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China’s own shale gas supplies and have analyzed to what extend it fulfills the country’s 
raising natural gas demand. Arriving at the conclusion that China’s own natural gas 
production is not enough to substitute its coal dependency this chapter has sought to 
reconsider China’s role in the global energy market as a major customer and how renewed 
role might expand China’s importance in the geopolitics of Central Asia and most 
importantly the geopolitics of Turkmenistan. 
Two chapters have been devoted to an analysis of the previous bilateral natural gas 
trade relations between Russia-Turkmenistan and Iran-Turkmenistan. The two countries 
were the first energy partners of Turkmenistan starting from the first years following the 
country’s independence. In the chapter on Russia, I discussed the gradual development of 
bilateral energy relations between the two countries and then, the sharp decline in their 
bilateral energy cooperation. Chapter three has outlined Russian dominance as the regional 
geopolitical power in Central Asia and the way Russia has used their geopolitical 
advantage to eliminate the possibility of rising competition such as Turkmenistan. This 
chapter argues that even though Russia could easily prevent Turkmenistan from expanding 
its energy routes to Europe, it has not been able to deter Turkmenistan from exporting its 
natural gas eastwards, particularly to China.  
Iran on the other hand was the first country with whom Ashgabat was able to start 
bilateral relations on energy cooperation without Russia’s direct interference. The success 
of bilateral relations between these two neighbors was mainly due to the fact that the two 
are sharing a common border and up until recently the two were able to maintain a 
symbiotic relationship in terms of energy cooperation.  I argue that despite the current 
tensions between the two parties regarding Iran’s outstanding debt to Turkmenistan, the 
outcome of negotiations will most likely be settled due to Turkmenistan’s dependency on 
Iran’s barter goods (mainly agricultural products). Hence, strategically, the resolution of 
this conflict is important because of the future possibility of the creation of an LNG hub on 
the Iranian side of the Gulf, fed by pipelines from the Turkmen border through Iran’s 
territory. 
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The main objective of the chapter on the Caspian was to demonstrate serious, 
seemingly insurmountable challenges of the Trans-Caspian pipeline project despite the 
financial support from the European Union offered as a result of the EU’s energy security 
concerns and its intention to reduce its dependence of Russian natural gas imports. While 
there are several factors that have made this project unfeasible, I mainly focus on the 
unresolved status of Caspian negotiations that have still been continuing for almost two 
decades 
The last chapter where I consider the future scenarios focuses on the three projects; 
first projects. The first one is the recently commissioned Central Asia-China pipeline; the 
second project is the newly signed TAPI pipeline and the third potential project is 
Turkmenistan natural gas feeding into an LNG hub in the Gulf. For each of these projects I 
have identified possible challenges that potentially could lead to the failure of the project. 
The first three strings of Central Asia- China have been completed while the last line is 
currently delayed by China, which has now access to plenty of LNG delivered at 
competitive prices to eastern coast. As for the second scenario, despite the formal signing 
of the contract, the future of the TAPI pipeline remains uncertain, due to the enormous 
security risks in areas where it is planned to be constructed. It is the third scenario that 
remains viable, despite serious economic, financial and diplomatic challenges. The 
viability of this scenario, to create an LNG hub as joint venture between Iran and 
Turkmenistan, remains to large extent on the continued natural gas demand of China, and 
later that of India, and on the near-term gas price and availability in the Asian as well as 
global markets. 
From a theoretical standpoint, there are three major dynamics at play with respect to 
the geopolitical situation of Turkmenistan: post-Soviet legacy, neighboring hegemony, and 
national borders. The continuation of Russian hegemony after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union played a major role in determining the bilateral gas trade relations with Central 
Asian countries, including Turkmenistan. This resulted in Russia’s monopolization of the 
gas trade through its control over post-Soviet pipeline networks. One of the major goals of 
Russian administration was to exclude Turkmenistan from trading their natural gas with 
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European countries. This policy reached its peak with unilateral termination of the contract 
between Gazprom and Turkmenistan, severing all flow of Turkmen gas to the West and 
turning Turkmenistan’s attention to the East, namely China and TAPI pipeline. 
China’s gradual shift from coal to natural gas coupled with its increasing demand for 
energy made Turkmenistan an attractive supplier. After Russia left Turkmenistan’s energy 
market, China was already investing in the common Central Asia – China pipeline thus, 
taking over from Russia as the future regional hegemon. 
By way of conclusion, Turkmenistan in its 26 years of independence has had to 
manage its own natural gas reserves in the face of disadvantaged geopolitical, landlocked 
position. A lack of access to international water has meant that pipeline routes, 
notwithstanding the Caspian, had to always pass through other territories therefore leaving 
it vulnerable to the particular internal dynamics of each country. With respect to its 
neighbors, Turkmenistan like other countries in the region has had to deal with Russian 
influence concerning its monopolization of and interference in the gas trade. As for the 
TAPI pipeline, which has been Niyazov’s “pipe” dream since the mid-1990s, security 
concerns in each of the three countries – namely Afghanistan, Pakistan and India –  has so 
far put this project in doubt. This leaves China as the only viable customer for Turkmen 
gas in the coming years with the possible expansion of existing projects and the creation of 
new ones. 
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